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The economic recession that started in 2007 led to renewed inter-
est in public employment and training services. At the same time, the 
accompanying fi nancial crises also elevated concern for how dwindling 
government budgets could be spent more effi ciently and effectively to 
maximize returns to public investments in training. As discussed in the 
introductory chapter, revamping incentive systems in government is a 
critical step toward improving government performance and our future 
economic outlook.
The chapters in this volume marshal some of the most detailed evi-
dence available on how performance standards and incentives infl uence 
the behavior of program administrators and staff and contribute to pro-
gram outcomes or unintended consequences. Since each chapter pres-
ents a self-contained summary of its main fi ndings, we do not review 
the details of each one. Instead, this conclusion presents three main 
lessons learned from these essays and discusses some of their policy 
implications.
LESSON 1: AGENCIES RESPOND TO INCENTIVES
Concerns that performance incentives are disregarded by govern-
ment employees because award levels are low or because benefi ts are 
diffused are not justifi ed. Low-powered cash incentives may, in fact, be 
high-powered because of the value of the budgetary awards in estab-
lishing the reputation of bureaucrats and the recognition that comes 
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with them. Bonuses and award money create leverage in the social ser-
vices community and are thus frequently highly prized (Heinrich 2007). 
The evidence reported by Courty and Marschke in Chapter 7 demon-
strates that agencies made placement, enrollment, and termination deci-
sions in ways that were consistent with maximizing their performance 
as measured by the JTPA performance standards system. The evidence 
presented by Heinrich in Chapter 8 reveals that although caseworkers 
claimed to discount performance standards in decision making, they 
nevertheless selectively enrolled into JTPA people who were likely to 
contribute to the placement goals rewarded under the performance stan-
dards system. 
Courty and Marschke and Heinrich also present a dark side to the 
behavior elicited by the JTPA performance standards system. Training 
centers showed remarkable ingenuity in manipulating the JTPA account-
ing system and reporting requirements in their efforts to boost their 
measured performance. Practices included enrolling persons receiv-
ing job search assistance or on-the-job training only after they found 
a job, using short-term training arrangements in order to maximize the 
probability of counting a successful placement, holding persons who 
did not fi nd jobs in dead-end job clubs, and releasing poorly perform-
ing trainees from the program at strategic accounting dates when it did 
least damage to training center performance records. These all represent 
behaviors that make perfect sense in terms of the performance stan-
dards, but they do nothing to raise participant earnings or increase the 
equity with which program services are distributed. 
The problem of regulating job-training programs—or any govern-
ment agency—is that enforceable regulations cannot be written too 
fi nely, and simple rules can and will, as shown in this volume, be sub-
verted. Along these lines, performance standards systems designers 
also need to grasp the dynamic properties of performance incentive sys-
tems, as discussed in Chapter 5 and illustrated throughout this volume. 
An incentive system designer’s understanding of how individuals will 
respond to performance standards will inevitably be imperfect prior to 
their introduction, and it is only as performance measures and targets are 
tried, evaluated, modifi ed, and/or discarded that their responses become 
known (Courty and Marschke 2007). Of course, this type of monitor-
ing to assess a measure’s effectiveness and possible distortion requires 
a considerable investment on the part of incentive system designers, 
chapter10.indd   306 4/27/2011   9:56:28 AM
Lessons for Advancing Future Performance Standards Systems   307
one that has probably been underestimated in the past. And as Heinrich 
and Marschke (2010) point out, learning on the part of bureaucrats will 
advance over time as well, as they come to better know the distinct 
weaknesses of performance measures and how they can be exploited 
through their day-to-day experiences. Incentive system designers will 
have to expect to regularly review and revise the rules and incentives 
they create if they want to avoid the ineffi cient behavior documented in 
the chapters in this volume. 
LESSON 2: CURRENT PERFORMANCE STANDARDS DO 
NOT PREDICT LONG-RUN GAINS
While the chapters by Courty and Marschke and Heinrich indi-
cate that the JTPA performance standards system effectively motivated 
agency staff and service providers to meet short-run performance stan-
dards, they do not indicate whether the measures themselves are appro-
priate to induce the achievement of the primary program goals, i.e., 
increasing the earnings of program participants (or the value added of 
the program). Chapter 9 demonstrates that the short-run performance 
measures featured by the JTPA performance standards system were 
weakly and often perversely related to the long-term effects of the pro-
gram on the earnings and employment of participants. Yet it is these 
long-term effects that constituted the true goal of the program’s services. 
The analysis also reveals that the measurement of wages and employ-
ment at a later point following termination represented no improve-
ment in the performance monitoring system. Neither set of measures 
was strongly positively related to long-run program impacts on earn-
ings and employment, suggesting that the performance standards sys-
tem did not promote the program’s key objectives of long-run gains in 
earnings and employment for participants. We see no reason to expect 
that the relationships between the performance measures and programs 
have changed under WIA and thus no reason to think that this problem 
has gone away.
From the perspective of policymakers and taxpayers who would 
like to maximize the value from government dollars spent on public 
programs, the goal of incentive system designers should be to choose 
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performance measures so that the effects of bureaucratic actions on mea-
sured performance are aligned with the effects of those same actions on 
value added. However, we frequently lack the information required to 
realize this objective in practice. Empirical research, as Heckman and 
Smith suggest, has focused primarily on estimating measures of statisti-
cal association between performance and value added, where the value 
added of programs has been assessed through the use of randomized 
experiments or through sophisticated statistical modeling. The dynam-
ics of performance standards systems, however, may limit the useful-
ness even of these estimates, as the alignment between a performance 
measure and value added may decrease after a performance measure is 
introduced and bureaucrats respond by exploring all strategies for rais-
ing it, not just those that also increase program value added. Clearly, 
this will continue to be one of the most vexing issues for performance 
standards system designers for some time to come.
LESSON 3: THE CREAM SKIMMING PROBLEM 
IS OVERSTATED
The charge of cream skimming has arisen frequently in public job 
training programs, including the Workforce Investment Act program. 
In Chapters 3, 6, and 9, we defi ne various uses of this term and pre-
sent evidence that fears about cream skimming are overstated. For most 
demographic groups, experimental estimates of the earnings impacts 
of participation in JTPA are uniform over broad skill levels. Only at 
the lowest skill levels is there any evidence that impacts were smaller 
than at higher levels of the skill distribution. While there is some evi-
dence of a trade-off between serving the most disadvantaged within 
eligible populations and allocating program resources most effi ciently, 
it appears to be a modest one given the modest benefi ts realized by 
program participants.
Cream skimming is usually defi ned as arising from purposive 
screening behavior by bureaucrats. Chapters 6 and 8 present informa-
tion about disparities in program participation rates among different 
demographic groups. Even among eligible persons, there are substantial 
differences in program participation rates. It is not enough to compare 
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participation rates among the eligible to determine if cream skimming 
is an important factor. At issue is how much of the difference in par-
ticipation rates conditional on eligibility is due to the voluntary choices 
of individuals, how much is due to their lack of information about the 
program, and how much is due to the decisions of bureaucrats. The 
decompositions of participation rates into components due to eligibil-
ity, awareness, and acceptance that are presented in Chapter 6 reveal 
that personal choices and lack of information play the major role in 
accounting for demographic disparities in participation. Administrative 
discretion also has some role to play in determining the participation 
rates of different groups in public job training programs, but it is not the 
dominant factor.
The evidence in Chapters 6 and 8 indicates that those whose char-
acteristics make them more employable and more easily placed were 
more likely to be screened into the JTPA system. However, the analysis 
of Chapter 6 reveals that the same characteristics that make a person 
more attractive in terms of achieving objectives within the job place-
ment system also made that person more aware of the program and 
more willing to apply to it. Thus, if resources are going to be used to 
improve equity in access to programs with voluntary enrollment, incen-
tive system designers and program administrators should consider 
investing more in (or providing incentives for) increasing awareness of 
the program among the eligible population.
We realize that there will be some limits to the generalizability 
of these fi ndings and the lessons of this collection of studies to other 
public program contexts, and that there is inherent variability in the 
potential of performance standards systems for improving government 
performance in the many different contexts in which they have been 
introduced or considered. At the same time, it is clear that there is no 
diminishing of demand on the part of policymakers or the public for 
greater accountability and a results-oriented focus of government. The 
research in this volume suggests that there is considerable work to do 
in addressing the fl aws of current public sector performance standards 
systems as well as investing in research that will guide improvements 
and advancements to these systems as their use expands in the public 
sector.
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